Abstract: Motivated by the search for instruments of macroprudential policy, we examine the impact of transaction (Tobin) taxes and capital gains taxes on residential house price growth.
Introduction
As demonstrated powerfully in the recent crisis, developments in the housing market have a major effect on financial sector stability and real economic activity. The recent turbulences in the financial sector were at least partly caused by the build-up and subsequent collapse of property prices. 1 In the past housing, booms tended to be followed by long lasting recessions and considerable output losses. 2 The recent house price bust in various countries confirmed the potential danger housing price cycles can pose to financial stability.
A main lesson from the recent crisis is that policy-makers should pursue macroprudential policy to strengthen the financial system's resilience to economic downturns and limit the build-up of risks to financial stability. 3 In most economies, macroprudential policy frameworks are at an early stage of development, and the evidence for their effectiveness is tentative. 4 One macroprudential instrument authorities may use to limit or pre-empt real estate price booms is a (variable) cap on loan-to-value ratios of mortgages.
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Another instrument is taxation of real estate acting as an automatic stabilizer for housing prices. 6 In this study we examine the effectiveness of taxes on real estate transaction values (Tobin tax) and capital gains as macroprudential instruments to smooth price growth in the residential housing market. We exploit the variation in taxation across 21 Swiss cantons as well as within-canton changes in taxation over time during the period 1985 -2009. We relate excessive house price growth in 92 regions to the taxation of real estate transaction values and capital gains in the canton the region is located in.
In cross-sectional and panel regressions we find that a tax on long-term capital gains smoothes house prices. Cantons with higher taxes on long-term capital gains display less volatility of house price growth over our observation period. Moreover, in periods of high fundamental demand for housing, cantons with higher taxes on long-term capital gains experience less excessive price growth. By contrast, we find that a penalty tax on short-term capital gains fuels excessive price growth when housing demand is strong. Finally, our results suggest that cantons with higher transaction (Tobin) taxes experience less excessive price growth.
Our results suggest to policy makers that Tobin taxes and capital gains taxes are not uniformly suitable as instruments of macroprudential policy. In particular, due to lock-in effects for existing home-owners, the use of penalty taxes on short-term capital gains seems to be counterproductive to the objective of systemic stability. Taxes on long-term capital gains and transaction values, by contrast, seem to be viable instruments for macroprudential policy.
Switzerland is a particularly interesting country in which to study the effects of real estate taxes for two reasons. First, given the substantial variation in taxation of real-estate transaction values and capital gains across its cantons, Switzerland provides a unique opportunity to study how taxes impact on residential house price growth in an homogeneous macroeconomic environment with an integrated banking sector and common legal system. By comparison, cross-country studies of regulation, taxation and house prices are marred by (unobservable) macroeconomic and structural characteristics across countries. Second, Switzerland has in the past experienced a financial sector crisis due to a real estate boom. The sharp rise in real estate prices in the 1980s, followed by a slump in prices in the early 1990s, The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a review of related work. Section 3 presents our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our results and section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
There is an extensive theoretical and empirical literature examining the impact of housing tax policy on housing decisions (cf., for instance, Smith et al. 1988 and Nakagami and Pereira 1995) . By contrast, only little research has been devoted specifically to the effects of taxation on price developments in real estate markets. In this section we focus on those contributions which study the impact of transaction (Tobin) taxes and capital gains taxes on house price dynamics. This literature provides ambiguous predictions and inconclusive empirical findings on the relationship between transaction taxes, capital gains taxes and house price developments.
Theoretical studies
The idea to tax financial transactions in order to reduce asset price volatility was introduced by Keynes (1936) for stock exchanges and Tobin (1978) for currency markets. Stiglitz (1989) argues that a transaction tax can reduce speculative trading and price volatility in asset markets. However, the subsequent theoretical literature suggests that transaction taxes may amplify rather than smooth price fluctuations, for instance by reducing the liquidity of asset markets (cf., e.g., Hau 2006) . The effect of a capital gains tax on asset price volatility is also theoretically ambiguous (cf. Fuest et al. 2004 for an overview). The model of Stiglitz (1983) , for example, shows that such a tax may increase volatility. In his model, a capital gains tax leads households to postpone the realization of capital gains (lock-in effect 7 ) and bring forward capital losses, lifting asset prices when there is upward price pressure and reducing them when the prices of assets are low.
With respect to the housing market, Englund (1986) suggests that capital gains taxes on real estate can exacerbate price dynamics by giving rise to lock-in effects which inhibit trade. 8 He considers in a two-period overlapping-generations (OLG) model whether capitalgains taxation increases or decreases market demand for owner-occupied housing. In a growing economy an increase in the capital gains tax lowers housing demand for low tax rates, reducing price dynamics. However, as soon as the tax rate reaches a critical value, the household chooses to stick to the same house for both periods and demand picks up. The general conclusion is that a high capital-gains tax may not dampen, but actually accelerate the development of house prices.
7 A homeowner postponing the realization of a capital gain is hit by a lower tax rate in present value terms. 8 Englund (1985) compares taxation of capital gains on realization with taxation on accrual in the context of owner-occupied housing in an infinite-horizon model. Taxing capital gains upon realization rather than as the gains accrue boils down to giving the taxpayer an interest-free loan, effectively taxing capital gains at a lower rate than other income, thereby violating the principles of comprehensive income taxation. Cf. Diamond (1975) and King (1977) . Fuest et al. (2004) also use a two-period OLG model to examine whether capital gains taxes increase or decrease fluctuations in house prices. They argue that households who buy their real estate in a boom are likely to suffer a capital loss. By contrast households buying their real estate in a recession are likely to make a capital gain when selling it. A capital gains tax reduces the expected losses of those buying in the boom and reduces the gains of those buying during recession. As a consequence the former will pay more while the latter will pay less so that real estate prices increase even further in booms and fall even more in recessions.
There is to our knowledge no theoretical paper which explicitly models the implications of a transaction tax (Tobin tax) on house price dynamics. Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) show in a search model with endogenous house prices that a transaction tax unambiguously leads to lock-in effects. Their model does not consider the implications of this effect for house prices in a dynamic setting. However, according to the model of Englund (1986) mentioned above, lock-in effects in the real estate market would amplify house-price volatility. Hoyt and Rosenthal (1992) simulate the effects on housing demand from a simultaneous increase in the capital gains tax rate and a lowering of federal marginal income tax rates, consistent with the US Tax Reform Act in 1986 (TRA86). Rollover provisions in the US tax code enable homeowners to avoid paying tax on the capital gains from the sale of their home if they purchase another home of equal or greater value within a certain period of when they moved. Because of these tax provisions households face a different price of housing depending on whether they purchased a more (buy up) or less expensive house (buy down). Against this legal background, the TRA86 increased the difference in the price of housing services between buying up versus buying down. On the one hand an increase in the capital gains tax rate raised the penalty for buying down, on the other lower marginal tax rates raised the user cost of owner-occupied housing. As a result housing demand would fall with a decrease in the capital gains tax rate as additional previous homeowners buy down. Lundborg and Skedinger (1998) provide evidence on the size of the lock-in effect due to capital gains taxation based on survey data of 6,000 Swedish home owners during the 1980s. Their results suggest that capital gains taxation reduces the probability of buying down for households with too high a housing consumption. However, capital gains taxes do not appear to have lock-in effects for households which want to buy up, i.e. those whose income has risen or family size increased and thus for whom consumption is regarded as too small. Rosen et al. (1984) examine how capital gains taxes affect the risk associated with home ownership. They estimate the impact of capital gains taxation on the tenure choice during the second half of the 1970s, taking into account the uncertainty about the user cost of housing and assuming perfect supply elasticity. Based on US time series and cross sectional data they show that capital gains taxes may, on balance, increase the proportion of owneroccupiers. Two opposing effects are working. On the one hand, the expected cost of owning increases. On the other hand, the forecast error variance of the user cost is sufficiently reduced to dominate.
Empirical studies
Closest to our study, Sheffrin and Turner (2001) examine the impact of capital gains taxes across different metropolitan regions with varying patterns of house price dynamics.
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Using household data from 1985 to 1995 they find that households would, on the one hand, benefit from a capital gains tax by reducing the volatility of housing prices. On the other hand 9 From a methodological point of view the panel analysis based on US interstate variation in capital gains taxation during 1979-90 provided by Bogart and Gentry (1995) is the most similar to our approach. In contrast to our paper which looks at the impact on house price dynamics, Bogart and Gentry look at the relation between capital gains tax rates and capital gains realizations. They find that capital gains realizations are negatively related to capital gains tax rates, suggesting lock-in effects from capital taxation.
capital gains taxes increase the user cost. On balance, and contrary to Rosen et al. (1984) , the latter effect dominates, leaving households on average worse off. However, the results vary strongly by metropolitan areas and over time. Households in high-volatility areas would benefit from capital taxes whereas homeowners in high-appreciation cities would be hurt.
To our knowledge there is no empirical study which examines the impact of a Tobin tax on house price dynamics. As surveyed by Hau (2006) , the empirical evidence on the relation between transaction costs and asset price volatility is inconclusive. Based on his panel regressions using data from the French stock exchange between 1995 and 1999 he argues that security transaction taxes in particular are likely to increase volatility.
Our study complements the literature presented above by examining the impact of crosssectional and time-variation in transaction and capital gains taxes on house price growth.
Compared to the above studies on US and Swedish data, our analysis benefits from the fact that we observe varying levels of taxation across regions within a country and over a long period of time. Compared to potential cross-country studies on taxation our analysis has the advantage of studying a sample of regions which have a harmonized macroeconomic policy, an integrated banking system and a common legal environment. 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 . 10 We include in our analysis the four MS-regions (Laufental (25), La Broye (93), La Chaux-de Fonds (103) and Murten (42)) for which a share of 21 to 40 percent of the population in these MS-regions is living in communes belonging to one or more other cantons than the canton listed in Table A1 . All our results are confirmed in robustness tests dropping these four MS-regions.
[ Figure 1 here]
The second observation from Figure 1 is that the price growth of condominiums displays stronger variation across time than that of single-family homes. In the periods of strongest price increases median price growth for condominiums exceeds that of single-family houses by 1.7% per year (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) and 0.6% per year (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , respectively. By contrast in the two periods of real price decline (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ) the prices of condominiums displayed lower median growth than those of single-family houses.
The third observation from Figure [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] ) also display substantial regional variation in price developments.
Taxation of real estate capital gains and transaction values
The taxation of real-estate capital gains and transaction values differs strongly across Swiss cantons. 11 We collected information on the tax regimes and tax rates from the authorities of the 26 cantons over the period 1980-2005. Appendix A2 provides an overview of the current tax regimes of the capital gains tax and transaction tax (Tobin tax) by canton.
Due to missing data only 21 cantons are included in our sample.
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We employ three indicators of taxation in our empirical analysis. The first two tax indicators measure the taxation of real estate capital gains by canton. 13 For private households, each canton levies a real-estate capital gains tax, which is independent of the income or wealth status of the tax payer. 14 The capital gains tax is levied each time a gain on real estate has been realized and is due by the seller. The gain is computed as the selling price (transaction value) minus the original purchasing price plus the value increasing expenditures by the owner. In most of the cantons the tax rate is progressively related to the level of the capital gain, while in each canton there is an inverse relationship between the tax rate and the 11 Our analysis focuses on the taxation of capital gains and transaction values as we expect these taxes to influence house price growth. We do not examine the taxation of property values or (imputed) income, as we expect these taxes to affect the level of house prices rather than their growth. In Switzerland the holding of realestate, i.e. the property value and the income derived from it, are taxed. The imputed rent of owner-occupied housing is considered to be part of household income and is therefore subject to the ordinary income tax, while housing value is subject to wealth tax. Housing expenses such as mortgage interest can be deducted from income taxes while the mortgage itself from the wealth tax. In most cantons also maintenance costs or insurance premiums can be deducted from the income tax (SFTA 2010a (SFTA , 2010b . 12 There is no tax data available from the canton Zug and St. Gallen, and data for Jura and Solothurn is only available for a limited period. Data on mortgage interest rates for Appenzell A.Rh. are missing. 13 In Switzerland taxes are levied at the federal, at the cantonal and communal level. Income taxes are levied at all three state levels. Wealth taxes and property taxes are cantonal and communal, but the latter do not exist in all cantons. Capital gains taxes are cantonal and/or communal. The capital gains tax on movable private wealth was abolished in all cantons. The canton Graubünden was the last canton which abolished this tax in 1997 (SFTA 2010d). 14 For companies, gains on real estate are taxed either according to the corporate income tax rate or the above mentioned gains tax. As 89% of all residential buildings in Switzerland are owned by private persons we focus our analysis on cross-canton differences in the taxation of gains by private persons. Concerning private persons one has to distinguish between private wealth and business assets. On private wealth the capital gains tax is levied and on real estate that belongs to the business assets, the income tax is levied. We collected our three tax indicators at five points in time: 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. In this model X r,t is a vector of time-variant indicators of housing demand and supply growth at the region level. MS-region fixed effects α r account for time-invariant, structural differences across MS-regions, which may affect the housing market.
We employ four indicators to control for fundamental dynamics in housing demand and supply across MS-regions and our periods of observation. 20 The variable Population growth measures average annual population growth per MS-region and period. Population growth includes immigration which has been shown to affect house prices in Switzerland and 13 20 Steiner (2010) considers these indicators to be key determinants of Swiss housing dynamics at the country level.
other developed countries (cf., e.g., Degen and Fischer 2009 and Saiz 2007 Table 2 provides summary statistics by period for our indicators of housing demand and supply.
[ Table 2 here]
In addition to these direct measures of growth in housing demand and supply we control for structural differences across the regions which may affect the level of housing demand and supply and the way house prices react to exogenous shocks. . We calculate this indicator of volatility also for single-family house prices (Volatility SFH) and condominium prices (Volatility CON) separately.
3.4
Taxes and abnormal house price growth 
tax, Speculation multiplier and Transaction tax).
For each tax indicator we calculate the mean across our five observation points (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005) . We control for structural characteristics of MS-regions Y r which may affect the dynamics of the housing market. In particular we distinguish Urban MS-regions from rural ones, and MS-regions which are
Tourism destinations from those which are not. Our conjecture is that urban and touristic regions display stronger volatility of price growth. Finally we control for canton-level policy indicators Z c which may also affect house price dynamics. In particular, we control for the Income tax rate which varies strongly across Swiss cantons, and which has been argued to exert a strong influence on house prices (Bourassa and Hoesli, 2006) . 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009) (1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005) . We choose this approach in order to mitigate concerns of the endogeneity of tax policy. The tax rates set by the cantonal authorities could be endogenous to expected price growth, and this could bias our results in either direction. On the one hand, cantons which expect a strong growth in real-estate prices may hike their rates in advance in order to increase their tax revenue or to smooth house prices. Alternatively, due to the strong tax competition in Switzerland (cf., e.g., Brülhart and Jametti 2008) those cantons which expect higher future real estate gains and transaction values may actually reduce their tax rates. By using tax rates which are elicited at the beginning of a five year observation period, we hope to mitigate as much as possible these potential biases arising from forward-looking tax authorities. To further account for the potential endogeneity of tax policy, we conduct for models
[2] and [3] subsample analyses in which we exclude all MS-regions which may exert a significant impact on the tax policy in their canton. First, we limit our analysis to those cantons which are made up of at least three MS-regions. From these larger cantons we also drop all MS-regions which account for more than 20% of the population of the canton they are located in (averaged over our observation period).
While we attempt to tackle the endogeneity of tax policy, we only partly account for other correlations in our data, which may bias the results. First, we treat prices in each MSregion as independent observations, although it is highly likely that there are price spill-overs across the borders of MS-regions. We attempt to control for such spill-overs, at least within cantons, by clustering our error-terms in models [1] [2] [3] . Second, in our estimation of excess price growth (model 1) some of our explanatory variables, e.g. Population growth or Income growth may be endogenous to Price growth. We do not account for this potential endogeneity as we are not primarily interested in the estimators of these variables and we lack strong instruments for them. and condominiums (Price growth CON) in columns (3-4). For both housing categories we present our preferred model which includes MS-region fixed effects and benchmark these results against a model without fixed effects. The estimated coefficients suggest that the effects of our indicators of housing demand and supply are robust across these two specifications. However, the R-squared suggests that the specification with MS-region fixed effects is more accurate, confirming the presence of structural differences in the housing market across the regions.
Results

Abnormal house price growth
[ Table 4 here]
As far as single-family homes are concerned we find, as expected, a significant positive effect of population growth and income growth on price growth, while the effect of housing supply and the mortgage rate are significantly negative. The effects of our demand and supply indicators are not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful.
A 1% increase in Population growth raises single-family house price growth by roughly 0.6%
per year, while a 1% increase in per capita Income growth raises price growth by 0.9%.
The price growth of condominiums reacts (even) stronger to changes in demand than the prices for single-family homes. A 1% increase in population growth raises condominium price growth by 0.8%, while a 1% increase in per capita income raises price growth by 2%
per year. The price growth of condominiums also reacts stronger to changes in housing supply and interest rates. In line with our predictions the coefficients for Housing stock growth and Mortgage rate are both negative in all specifications. They are economically larger and more precisely estimated for condominium price growth than for single-family house price growth.
[ Figure 2 here] Based on the estimations in columns (2, 4) of 
Taxes and the volatility of house price growth
In this section we provide a cross-sectional analysis of the relation between the volatility in house price growth (Volatility SFH, Volatility CON) and the taxation of real estate transactions (Capital gains tax, Speculation multiplier, Transaction tax). In Table 5 we report estimates for model [2] .
[ Table 5 here]
The analysis reported in Table 5 suggests that the taxation of real estate capital gains or transactions values does not affect the volatility of price growth for single-family houses (Volatility SFH). In column (1) Accounting for the endogeneity of tax policy by excluding the "large" MS-regions in our sample has no notable effect on our estimates for single-family houses (column 3).
Strikingly, though, the smoothing effect of the capital gains tax on the price growth volatility of condominiums increases both in statistical and economic terms when we account for endogenous tax policy.
The results reported in Table 5 suggest thus that the taxation of real estate transactions has a limited smoothing effect on house price growth volatility. In particular, we find that only the tax on long-term capital gains (but not its short term penalty component or the transaction tax ) influences the volatility of price growth, and only for condominiums. This limited effect seems reasonable both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. From a theory point of view, the tax on long-term capital gains tax, in comparison to the penalty tax on short-term capital gains, is less likely to induce lock-in effects (Englund 1986) . From an empirical point of view, the market for condominiums in Switzerland does seem to be the more volatile market over time than that for single-family houses (cf. Figure 2 ). Thus it is not surprising that the capital gains tax has a stronger effect in the former than in the latter.
Housing demand, taxes and price growth
In the previous section we examined whether the taxation of real estate capital gains and transaction values reduces the volatility of house price growth, i.e. smoothes both abnormally high and abnormally low price growth. In this section we examine whether the Capital gains tax, Speculation multiplier and Transaction tax prevent excessive price growth in MS-regions which face a strong growth in the demand for housing. The impact of the capital gains tax and the Tobin tax under strong housing demand is arguably most interesting from the viewpoint of macroprudential policy.
[ Table 6 here] Table 6 variables we present a baseline specification (columns 1,4) with the main effects of our tax indicators only, and a main specification which includes their interaction terms with demand growth (columns 2,5). For each dependent variable we also present a specification in which we account for the endogeneity of tax policy to excessive house price growth (columns 3,6).
The results displayed in Table 6 suggest that the capital gains tax dampens excessive price growth in times of strong demand. The interaction term of Capital gains tax * Demand growth displays a significant negative coefficient for both single-family houses and condominiums. Taking into account the positive main effect of Capital gains tax reported in the first row of Table 6 , the coefficient estimated for condominiums (Residual growth CON) in column (6) suggests that a 1% increase in the capital gains tax would have almost no effect on excessive price growth in a MS-region with average demand growth (3.2% during our observation period). By comparison, in a MS-Region with demand growth of the average plus one standard-deviation (5.6%) a 1% increase in the capital gains tax would reduce excessive price growth by 0.03%. The effect of the capital gains tax under such strong demand growth is sizeable if we consider the current range of capital gains taxes across Swiss cantons. In 2005 the canton with the lowest capital gains tax was Obwalden (17%) while that with the highest capital gains tax was Graubünden (50%). With demand growth of 5.6% per year (i.e.
the average plus one standard deviation), MS-regions in Graubünden would experience 1% lower price growth per year than MS-regions in Obwalden. In line with our findings in Table   5 the interaction term of Capital gains tax * Demand growth is weaker in economic terms for single-family houses (column 2,3).
In contrast to the tax on long-term capital gains, our results suggest that penalty taxes on short term capital gains fuel excessive house price growth rather than dampen it.
Considering excessive price growth of single-family houses we find a significant positive coefficient for the interaction term Speculation multiplier * Demand growth irrespective of whether we account for endogenous tax policy (column 3) or not (column 2). For condominiums we find a significant negative coefficient, of similar economic magnitude, when we account for the endogeneity of tax policy (column 6). These results support theoretical models (Englund, 1986) which suggest that capital gains taxes may fuel excessive price growth by making house owners with short tenure more reluctant to sell their property (lock-in effect).
Finally, we find evidence that a transaction (Tobin) tax also smoothes house prices.
The coefficient of Transaction tax * Demand growth estimated in columns (2,3) is negative and significant suggesting that the transaction tax reduces price growth of single-family houses when housing demand is strong. Moreover, while we do not obtain a significant coefficient for Transaction tax * Demand growth in columns (5, 6), the main effect of Transaction tax is negative and significant in these models. This finding suggests that the transaction tax dampens price growth of condominiums too, and that this effect is not just limited to periods of strong housing demand.
Conclusions
Excessive growth of house prices is seen as one of the major determinants of the recent financial and economic crisis, in the US and in the euro area (e.g. Ireland). Motivated by the search for macroprudential instruments it has been argued that a Tobin tax and a capital gains tax on real-estate sales may dampen the swings in prices in the housing market by "throwing sand in the wheels" of short-term speculation. 27 We investigate the effect of capital gains taxes and Tobin taxes on house price dynamics, exploiting the variation in tax rates across Swiss cantons, as well as changes in these tax rates with cantons over the last three decades.
We find evidence that higher taxes on longer-term capital gains and higher transaction (Tobin) taxes smooth house price growth. By contrast, we find that a penalty tax on shortterm capital gains fuels excessive price growth when housing demand is strong. Our results suggest that transaction taxes and capital gains taxes are not uniformly suitable as instruments of macroprudential policy. In particular, due to lock-in effects for existing home-owners, the use of penalty taxes on short-term capital gains, as widely applied for example in Switzerland, may be counterproductive to the objective of systemic stability. -region 1985-1989 / 1990-1994 / 1995-1999 / 2000-2004 / 2005-2009 Price growth CON Average annual growth rate of the hedonic transaction price index of condominiums. W&P MS-region 1985 MS-region -1989 MS-region / 1990 MS-region -1994 MS-region / 1995 MS-region -1999 MS-region / 2000 MS-region -2004 MS-region / 2005 MS-region -2009 Capital gains tax Top marginal gains tax rate if real estate has been held for five years. Cantonal tax authorities, SFTA Canton 1985 / 1990 / 1995 / 2000 / 2005 Speculation multiplier The multiplier by which the Gains tax rate increases if real estate is sold after less than one year instead of after 5 years.
Cantonal tax authorities, SFTA Canton 1985 / 1990 / 1995 / 2000 / 2005 -region 1985-1989 / 1990-1994 / 1995-1999 / 2000-2004 / 2005-2008 Income growth Average annual growth rate of per capita income (nominal). BAK MS-region 1985 MS-region -1989 MS-region / 1990 MS-region -1994 MS-region / 1995 MS-region -1999 MS-region / 2000 MS-region -2004 MS-region / 2005 MS-region -2008 Demand growth Population growth + Income growth SFSO, BAK MS-region 1985 -1989 / 1990 -1994 / 1995 -1999 / 2000 / 2005 -2008 Housing stock growth Average annual net growth rate of the stock of dwellings (lagged by one observation period). SFSO MS-region 1985 MS-region -1989 MS-region / 1990 MS-region -1994 MS-region / 1995 MS-region -1999 MS-region / 2000 MS-region -2004 MS-region / 2005 MS-region -2008 Mortgage rate Mortgage interest rate offered by cantonal banks on new mortgages. Canton 1985 Canton -1989 Canton / 1990 Canton -1994 Canton / 1995 Canton -1999 Canton / 2000 Canton -2004 Canton / 2005 Canton -2008 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 separately and all 5 periods together. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in Table 1 . 2000-2004 2005-2009 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 Housing 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 . Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by canton are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Table 1 . Table 4 over all observation periods. All explanatory variables are averaged of our observation period. The models are estimated using MSregion-level data. In columns (3,6) we exclude "large" MS-regions within a canton: We only include cantons with at least 3 MS-regions and MS-regions which do not exceed 20% of the population of the canton they are located in. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by canton, are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Table 1 . 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009 . In columns (1-2, 4-5) we include all MS-regions. In columns(3,6) we include cantons with at least 3 MS-regions and MS-regions which do not exceed 20% of the population of the canton they are located in. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by canton, are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. Definitions and sources of all variables are provided in Table 1 . 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 Price growth (in % 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 Single family houses Condominiums
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Figure 2. Abnormal house price growth by period and MS-region
This figure displays box plots for the variables Residual growth SFH and Residual growth CON for the five periods 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2009 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 Price growth SFH Price growth CON 
Appendix A2. Tax regimes by canton
This table provides an overview of the current (2010) tax regimes of the real-estate capital gains tax and transaction tax by canton. For the capital gains tax Taxing authority indicates by who the tax is levied. Taxation of accumulated gains indicates whether all realized gains within a year are accumulated or taxed separately. If real estate was owner-occupied and the proceeds of selling it are reinvested within a certain time period in owner-occupied housing then taxation is postponed (Postponement upon reinvestment ). In GE the tax is reimbursed instead of postponed. The tax is also postponed in the case of inheritance (except in NE and GE) and donation. In some cantons the capital gains tax rate increases with the size of the gain (Progression gain ) and in all cantons the rate depends on the holding duration (Degression holding duration ). Some cantons have a base tax rate which is multiplied every year by a cantonal only or a cantonal, municipal and a parish-factor (Annual multiplier ). The tax rate may vary across municipalities (Variation across municipalities ). The transaction tax rate is Proportional in transaction value , Progressive in transaction value or is a Fixed fee . The transaction tax rate does not vary with the holding duration. The last column indicates whether there is a reduced transaction tax rate or no tax for certain types of transactions (for example transfers within family) (Exemptions ). In cantons where taxes vary across municipalities the tax rate of the major city has been used. The sources are the cantonal tax authorities and the SFTA. * In Zurich the transfer tax has been abolished per January 2005 and in Schwyz per January 2009. ** For gains from owneroccupied housing the tax is 30% independent of the holding duration.
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